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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Respondent
-vGARY L. ELLIS AND MARTY
WITHERS
Defendants/Anpellants

Case No. 20307

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an apneal from a judgment against nary L. Ellis
and Marty R. Withers for burglary of a dwelling, a second
degree felony.

A jury found them guilty following a trial

on August 1, 1934, in the Third District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson, Judge, presiding.

They were both sentenced to serve

a term of one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison.
The execution of the sentences was stayed and they were nlaced
on probation.
Statement of Pacts
Prior to trial a Motion in Limine and a Motion to
Sever was heard and denied by the Court.(R.28,29,38,47,48,49.)
At trial the following evidence was ellicited.

A burglar

alarm at the home of Vivian Armstrong went off on the night of
April 7, 1984.

She was out of town and the caretaker in her

absence, Bruce Austin, went to the premises. (T.I 3-8)
T
T.I.refers to trial transcript of July 30, 1934 and T.II referred
to trial transcript of August 1, 1984.

Mr. Austin was a former police officer of 26 years (T.I 30).
When he arrived at 4:20 a.m. he observed a broken window which
had not been broken the day before (T.I 12-13), and although
there was valuable property in the home, none was disturbed or
missing (T.I 13,19).

He observed an apparent bloodstain on

the curtain of the broken window (T.I 15,35) and^muddy footprints
inside the window leading to a sliding glass door

(opened 2

inches) and back again to the window (T.I 18,19). Mr. Austin testifi*
over objection,that there were two different sets of footprints
outside the broken window; one a pointed western boot, the
other a running shoe or tennis type shoe (T.I 20-22).

He

identified photographs (State's exhibits 4,5 and 6) of footprints
as accurately depicting what he observed, (T.I 23,24).

He

further testified over objection that the print of the boot
outside and inside looked the same (T.I 49).
Dennis Thayne was the first police officer to arrive
at the scene of the burglary.

While he was standing outside

the house,five minutes after he arrived and nine minutes after
he was dispatched (T.I 90,91),he observed a car with a loud
exhaust, distinctive in color (black over yellow with a red
door), drive past the house.

He saw the driver turn and look

at him and then accelerate (T.I 59). He saw at least two
people in the front seat but couldn't recognize the driver
(T.I 58,81).

He called in a description of the car as a

"suspicious vehicle" (T.I 60).

In the course of his investigation inside the premises,
Officer Thayne found broken glass in the muddy prints (T.I 70).
There were no fingerprints found, but soil samples were collected
(T.87-90).
Police Officer Ken Schoney
the suspicious car.

received a dispatch about

When he saw such a car not far from the

scene of the burglary (T.I 106) he pursued it, at one noint lost
it for 20 seconds, but then saw it parked (T.I 97-102).

As

he approached the car he saw defendant Ellis lying down in the front
seat and defendant Withers lying down in the back (T.I 103,104).
Mr. Withers was wearing tennis shoes, his levis were soaked
to the knee (T.I 110-111).

He stated his name was Marty Wolfe

(T.I 116). Over objection Officer Schoney testified that at
4:30 a.m. (T.I 117),when he asked Withers what he was doing
sleeping in the back of the car, Withers stated he had been
asleep in the back seat of the vehicle which had been parked
since midnight.

When he separately asked Ellis how long he had

been there, Ellis said ten to fifteen minutes.
were not wet and he had on black boots.

Ellis1 nants

The car engine was

slightly warm to the touch. (T.I 118-120).
Defense counsel made a Motion in Limine and preferred
the testimony of Bob Baldwin, an expert in the identification
of footprints whose report after examining the photos of the
footprints was "... there was insufficient detail present to
make any determination of tread design or size11.
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(T.I 129).

Defense counsel then moved to strike Mr. Austin's testimony
concerning his eyeball comparison of the footprints.

The

court held that a lay witness could testify to what he saw
to wit: that the prints appeared to him to be similar (T.132),
but that he would not allow any officer to testify that those
footprints apnear to be made by those shoes (T.I 135) Further
Officer Schoney testified that after he first saw the defendants'
parked car he radioed for assistance and while waiting for
approximately five minutes observed no movement in the car.
During his investigation he observed some pieces of glass on
the floor of the vehicle and on Mr. Ellis' boot (T.II 13). He
also found a napkin over the driver's visor with blood spots
(T.II 14). He confiscated,at the jail,Mr. Ellis' pants which
he described as dirty with lots of mud around the bottoms. He
said they were damp, but unot wet or dry!l (T.II 21,22).
Officer Shupe testified that the person in the back
was under a blanket (T.II 44). He said Mr. Ellis had a cut on
his forefinger (T.II 45), but when asked Mr. Ellis said nothing
was wrong with his hand (T.II 48). The officer described the
wound as "somewhat jagged, superficial,with dried blood
approximately one inch long and varying one quarter to one
half inch wide in its width

(T.II 50). Officer Kim Herbert

testified that he heard Mr. Withers say he had passed out
around midnight in West Valley City (T.II 69,87).

He also saw the

prints in the mud and could recall seeing only one set of prints
(T.II 79).
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A stipulation was entered into and read into the
record that particles of glass taken from the scene of the
burglary both outside and inside and from the defendants'
vehicle and Mr. Ellis1 boot did not match the glass at the
scene of the burglary (T.II 91). Counsel further stipulated
that soil samples from the defendantsf car and shoes and
from the scene of the burglary were not analyzed (T.II 92).
Also blood was drawn from Mr. Ellis and it was type A blood
(T.II 92). The blood on the napkin in the car was type
AB and thus not the blood of Ellis (T.II 93).

An expert

witness testified that the blood on the curtain was human
blood (T.II 100) and that it was her opinion that it was
type A blood but that because of the nature of the sample
she could not be positive (T.II 105). Since there was not
a sufficient sample to test for the five enzvme groupings,
she could only say the sample was consistent with type A,
and thus consistent with 40% of Caucasians (T.II 115).
Robert Baldwin, a footprint identification expert
was asked to do a comparison of the anaellants1 footwear with
pictures of footprints taken at the scene.

The results

were inconclusive; he could not say it was not the shoe, and
could not say it was (T.II 123) . He was asked if he would
be able, when called to the scene of the crime to compare
footprint impression which he observed
to say they were the same.

with a shoe and be able

He answered that that would depend

on the quality of the shoe impression, but that in terms of
scientific identification, "one doesn't generally use one's

eyes to compare the original impression in the mind. Generally
you have to do a one to one comparison for size purposes
and use a magnifying glass in looking at fine nicks and gouges ."
(T.II 125,126)

He testified that to make a comparison "you

have to have a pattern that: is sufficient to exclude"

(T.II 128),

After the close of the State's evidence, counsel for
both defendants moved to dismiss for lack of sufficient
evidence.

This motion was denied (T.II 140,141,146).

The

court did clarify to the jury in what regards they should treat
Mr. Austin's testimony concerning the footprints he observed.
"He can't give an opinion because he doesn't have expertise
in the field, but he can say what he saw and what appeared to
him to be similar" (T.II 148).
Larry Withers, Marty Withers' father, testified for the
defense, that he had seen his son at 10:00 p.m. that night
at his home in West Valley City with another person, not Mr.
Ellis

(T.II 148-150), At that time, he said, Marty was very

drunk, he was so drunk he was staggering and he borrowed some
money to get some more to drink (T.II 150-151).

Mr. Withers

said Marty had entered a alcohol program under the name of
Marty Wolfe because he had some outstanding traffic warrants
(T.II 150-154).
At the close of all the evidence defense counsel both
moved for a directed verdict of acquital due to the
insufficiency of the evidence.

This motion was denied.

They also objected to certain instructions (T.II 159). The
jury found the appellants guilty as charged (R.54).

Both counsel filed motions to arrest judgment
(R. 118,119,120).

On October 3, 1984 the motion on behalf

of Mr. Ellis was heard and denied (Transcript October 3, 1984
R. 440-461).

On March 15, 1985 the motion on behalf of Mr.

Withers was heard and denied (R.4, Marty Withers record
before consolidation,Supreme Court No. 20631).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The first argument on appeal is that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying the defendants f motion for
severance, after it had ruled that the defendants1 inconsistent
and incriminating out of court statements could be admitted
at trial under an exception to the hearsay rule.

The lower

court's refusal to sever the defendants' joint trial subjected
each defendant to substantial and unwarranted prejudice because
the inconsistent statements came into evidence in a form not
subject to cross-examination: the court's refusal to sever
stripped the defendants of their Sixth Amendment rights to
confrontation and effective assistance of counsel.
The second argument on appeal is that the lower
court erred in allowing a lay witness to give opinion testimony
which only an expert could meaningfully have given.

The

court allowed the security officer who had responsibility for
the house allegedly burglarized by the defendants to make
statements about the similarity of certain footprints on the
premises and about the similarity between police photographs
of the footprints and the defendants f footwear taken from
them at the time of their arrest.
-7-

The Utah Rules of Evidence

precluded this witness from giving the opinion testimony allowed
by the court below.

The lower court, in effect, permitted

a lay witness to appear to the jury to be an expert by allowing
him to make comparisons he could not meaningfully make about
the footprints.
The third issue presented on appeal is that the trial
court erred in denying the defendants1 motions to arrest judgment
on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence.

The case

presented by the prosecution was 100 percent circumstantial;
the state's evidence that each defendant committed the actus
reus and possessed the requisite mens rea of second degree
burglary could not have led reasonable minds to foreclose all
of the interpretations of the evidence consistent with the
defendants' innocence.

The verdict in the trial below was

a product of an overzealous jury and should have been laid
aside by the court.
The fourth argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred in refusing to read to the jury the defendants' requested
alternative reasonable hypothesis instruction.

The state's

case against the co-defendants was 100 percent circumstantial.
Therefore, when the jury was given a mere reasonable doubt
instruction, its members were not invested with an adequate
sense of their responsibility to exclude all reasonable
theories of the facts consistent with the innocence of the
defendants before returning a guilty verdict.
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ARGIF1ENTS
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

BY DEFYING THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SEVERANCE.
At the time of their arrest, the defendants made
conflicting statements to the arresting officer concerning
their activities on the night in question.

Mr. Ellis told

the officer that he and Mr. Withers had been out drinking
and driving around all night and that they had been parked at
their present location for 10 to 15 minutes (T.120).

Mr.

Withers told the officer that the car had been parked in its
present location for four hours and that he (Mr. Withers) had
been passed out in the back seat all that time (T.18).
Once the trial court had ruled, at a pre-trial motion,
that the co-defendants1 inconsistent statements could be testified
to by the arresting officer under an exception to the hearsay
rule, the court then denied the defendants1 joint and timely
motion for severance (R.482). 2 (Addendum A) The defendants respectfully
submit that this denial constituted an abuse of judicial discretion.
Because the inconsistent and incriminating statements of the
defendants were admitted at trial in a form not subject to

^hus. it should be noted that the trial court was fully aware
of the nature of the defendants1 inconsistent statements before
trial began: just prior to argument on the motion to sever, defense
counsel for Gary Lynn Ellis made a Motion in Limine to exclude the
statement made by Mr. Ellis at the time of his arrest (refered to
in the first paragram of Point I). (R.464)
-9-

cross-examination, the defendants were effectively denied their
Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and effective assistance
of counsel.
The Utah statute regarding joinder and severance of
defendants is Utah Code Annotated §77-35-9 (1953 as amended).

The

applicable sections state:
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the
same indictment or information if they are alleged
to have participated in the same act or conduct
in the same criminal episode.
Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts
together or separately and all of the defendants need
not be charged in each account.
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with
any offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the
court in its discretion, on motion or otherwise, orders
separate trials consistent with the interests of justice,
(emphasis added).
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the prosecution
is prejudicied by the joinder of offenses or defendants
in an indictment or information, or by a joinder for
trial together, the court shall order an election of
separate trials of separate counts, or grant a severance
of defendants, or provide such other relief as justice
requires.
This jurisdiction's standard for determining whether
a trial court has abused its discretion in denying severance
is still evolving.
In State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 355 P.2d 689, 698
(Utah 1960), this court stated:
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with
any offense, they shall be tried jointly, unless the
court in its discretion orders separate trials. If the
ruling of the court deprives the defendant of a fair
trial, then the judge has abused his discretion. The
discretion may not be exercised arbitrarily.

In State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1350 (Utah 1977),
this court added

fl

...[a]s a general rule, joinder of defendants

is the procedure employed when...it^appears that persons were
jointly involved in the commission of a crime so that the
evidence against one is largely applicable to the other."
And finally in State v. Collins, 612 P.2d 775, 777
(Utah 1980), this court presented its most recent clarification
of and addition to the abuse of discretion standard:
The trial court must, when defendants are charged
jointly, weigh possible prejudice to any defendant
with considerations of economy and practicalities
of
judicial administration. Doubts concerning
prejudice should be resolved by the trial court in
favor of a defendant, but the trial court must be
accorded some discretion in denying a motion for
severance. A denial will be reversed by this
Court only if a defendant's right to a fair trial
has been impaired.
In Collins, this court refused to reverse the lower
court's denial of severance for two reasons:
A substantial part of the evidence and testimony
offered by the State was relevant to charges
against each of the defendants... Equally important,
none of the defenses of either accused was antagonistic
to the interests of any co-defendant.
Significantly, the issue of a denial of a right to
confrontation was not before this court in Collins.

The two

grounds for reversal--(1) that a substantial part of the evidence
is not relevant to charges against each defendant, and (2) that
the defendants are pursuing antagonistic defenses—announced by
the decision, then cannot be viewed as the sole criteria upon
which to base a reversal.

Indeed, Bruton v. United States, 391

U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed 476 (1968), indicates a further

basis for reversal which must be granted significant importance
when weighed against considerations of economy and the practicalities
of judicial administration.
In Bruton the Supreme Court held that out of court
statements and confessions made by a co-defendant which incriminate
another defendant violate the defendant's right of confrontation
unless the declarant co-defendant takes the stand and is subject
to cross-examination.
(1968).

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 133, 134

The evidence in Bruton, like the evidence in the present

case, was admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule as to
the declarant co-defendant.

The Supreme Court indicated that

because the person making the statement could not be placed on
the stand and tested by the cross-examination, the introduction
of an incriminating hearsay statement violated the defendant's
right to confront and cross-examine x^itnesses .
In the case before this court, the contradictory out
of court statements allegedly made by the defendants came into
court via the testimony of the arresting officer. (T.118-120)
The adverse and incriminating implications raised by the admission
of this evidence were at least significant factors in prompting
the jury to return a guilty verdict against the defendants.
Therefore, by allowing this evidence to come before the jury
untested and untried by defense counsel, the trial court stripped
the defendants' of their rights of confrontation under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

No amount

of savings in terms of judicial economy can warrant the cost
of denying a defendant his essential Sixth Amendment rights.

If severance had been granted below, each defendant's
out of court statement would have been ruled hearsay with in the
context of the other defendant's trial.

The statements made

by each defendant concerning the other defendant's activities
on the night in question could not be testified to by the
arresting officer at the defendant's separate trials.

Such

testimony would constitute hearsay in its classic form.

Severance,

then, would clearly have remedied the significant prejudice the
at least partially hearsay statements in this case caused each
of the co-defendants.

And the alleviation of such prejudice by

means of the mechanism of severance is precisely what Bruton
calls for in a case such as this.

Where out of court statements

made by defendants who will not take the witness stand incriminate
the defendants by virtue of being inconsistent, and where these
statements are used by the state as circumstantial evidence that
both the defendants possessed the requisite state of mind for
the crime charged, the inability of defense counsel to in any
way cross examine this evidence effectively denies the defendants
their Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation and effective
assistance of counsel.

Fairness dictates that severance should be

granted where a defendant is denied his right to confrontation.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING A LAY
WITNESS TO GIVE EXPERT OPlNIOti TESTIMONY.
At trial, the state called Bruce Austin, the security
officer who had responsibility for the residence allegedly broken

into by the defendants.

The prosecution asked Mr. Austin to

testify as to the similarity between the footprints outside
the house and those mud stains on the carpet inside the house
(T.48).

Mr. Austin was also allowed to remark that the footprints

outside the house, as rendered in police photographs, appeared
similar to .that of a boot and running shoe, footwear taken
from defendants at the time of their arrest (T.I 22) .Defendants f
counsel immediately objected to the admissibility of this lay
opinion evidence (T.20).

Further, defendants1 counsel made a

Motion in Limine asking that the jury be told not to consider
any lay testimony about the similarity between the footprints
in the police photogranhs and the defendants1 footwear (T.128-131).
The objection was overruled and the motion was denied (T.132).
However, at the sentencing hearing for Gary Ellis, the court
questioned its rulings:
The court would state this: The argument by
the defense, the Court is impressed with one
point, and that is the question as far as the
police officer and the testimony he gave. The
Court made an explanation, as I recall, I
made an explanation to the jury after that took
place. And it was not the Court's intention
that that particular individual give his opinion.
He did state, though, my opinion is so and so.
I think the explanation was made to the jury that
he could state what he saw, what he observed
concerning it. But I think that is a matter
that the Supreme Court, if it goes to them, would
have an opportunity to look at and make a
determination of whether the evidence did come in,
there wasn't sufficient explanation to correct it,
if it was wrong. As I say, the Court does have
some question on that (R. 454).
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Certainly, opinion evidence may be given by either a
lay or expert witness.

However, the Appellants1 claim that the

lay testimony in question should have been admitted into evidence
because Mr. Austin was giving an opinion about something he
could not evaluate meaningfully:

the witness was not an expert

in the comparison of footprints.

Defense counsel did submit,

on stipulation, the statement of an expert in footprint
comparison and in this statement the expert concluded that there
was no way to compare the poor quality police photographs with
the tread on the defendants1 footwear (T.11,123).

Mr, Austin's

lay opinion was, at best, of slight probative value with respect
to any factual issue in the case.

Nevertheless, the very real

possibility exists that the lay testimony given by this former
police officer and security specialist was construed as expert-or quasi-expert—opinion by the jury and was thus accorded
significance far beyond its evidentiary value.

The defendants

contend that the admission of this testimony constitutes
significant prejudicial error.
The Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provide:
Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses.
If the witness is not testifying as an expert,
his testimony in the form of opinion or
inferences is limited to those opinions or
inferences which are (a) rationally based on
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful
to a clear understanding of his testimony or
the determination of a fact in issue.
There are no Utah cases affording standards by which
to apply Rule 701. A standard was articulated for Rule 56 (1)
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of the old Utah Rules of Evidence, however, and this standard
readily applies to Rule 701.

In Arnovitz v. Telia, 495 P.2d

310, 311 (Utah 1972), this court said:
It is generally recognized that opinions or
conclusions of ordinary witnesses derived
from common experience and observation of
things which persons generally are capable
of comprehending and understanding are
admissible in evidence when the nature of
the subject-matter is such that it cannot
be reproduced or detailed to the jury
precisely as it appeared to the witness
at the time, or where it is not practicable
to lay before the jury the primary or
constituent facts, so that they can draw
the proper inferences and form an intelligent
j udgment.
The Appellants contend that the photographs of the
footprints taken at the scene of the crime are sufficiently
detailed to enable the jury to see what Mr. Austin saw
"precisely as it appeared to [him] at the time.fT

If the

police investigation team was remiss in obtaining adequate
photographs of the mudstains inside the house, then admittedly
this would be a situation "where it is not practicable to
lay before the jury the primary or constituent facts" without
opinion testimony.

However, the Appellants must stridently

contend that the kind of comparison the court allowed Mr.
Austin to make--a comparison as to the "similarity" of the
different sets of footprints--is one which could meaningfully
be made, and reported to the jury, only by an expert.

There

was no foundation laid at trial that Mr. Austin had ever had
any training in footprint comparison.

The prosecution simply

asked the witness, as an entirely lay observer, to comment on

the similarity between the sets of footprints (T.20-30).

Mr.

Austin did not possess sufficient expertise even to report
that the footprints were "similar".

Furthermore, an expert's

comparison, in order to be valid, would have to involve more
than the casual, cursory examination Mr. Austin was able to
afford the evidence. (T.20-30)
Mr. Austin's testimony cannot be viewed as "rationally
based on [his] perception."

Rule 701(a) mandates exclusion

of this opinion testimony.

Similarly, Rule 701(b) works to

exclude the lay testimony because Mr. Austin's opinion as to
the similarity between the footprints inside and outside of
the house could not validly further the prosecution's proof
that either Mr. Withers or Mr. Ellis was in the house on the
night in question; the lay opinion was decidedly not "helpful...
to the determination of a fact in issue." Rule 701(b), Utah
Rules of Evidence (1983 as amended).

Given a jury's probable

tendency to invest great importance in a former police officer's
testimony as to the similarity between two objects, a court
should carefully limit or exclude such lay comparisons.
In light of the trial court's hindsight doubt about
its decision to overrule the defendants' objections to the
testimony in question, and in light of the contention that the
testimony is inadmissible under Rule 701, Utah Rules of
Evidence (1983) , the Appellants respectfully submit that the
prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative
value.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT
ON THE BASIS OF INSUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE .
*
Gary Lynn Ellis and Marty R, Withers were jointly
convicted of second degree burglary.

Prior to Mr. Ellis'

sentencing, counsel for the defendants filed separate motions
to arrest judgment on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence
(AddendumB).

The motions were denied (R.454), (R.4) 3. The

jury verdict as to both defendants in the case should be
overturned because the prosecution1 s evidence, even when
stretched to its reasonable limits, is insufficient to establish
that either defendant is guilty of second degree burglary.
The power of this Court to review the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting a guilty verdict is well established.
In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1983), this Court
stated, "...not withstanding the presumptions in favor of the
jury's decision this Court: still has the right to review the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict."

Further,

the Court noted:
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime for which he was convicted. Id. at 444.

^Chis cite is to the trial record of State v. Marty Withers,
District Court CR84-501, Supreme Court #20631 also #20307.
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The evidence must be reviewed in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict.
842 (Utah 1982).

State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d

Even stretching the evidence to its logical

limit, however, the court may not take a speculative leap to
bridge the gap between the evidence needed to convict and the
evidence actually presented at trial.

State v. Petree, 659

P.2d 443, 445.
In State v. Lamm, 606 ^.2d 229, 234-35 (Utah 1980),
the dissent notied:
If the circumstances essential for conviction
are ambiguous and consistent with the innocence
of the accused, then this Court must hold as
a matter of law that there is not substantial
evidence to support the guilt of the accused.
This standard restates the Due Process requirements
which prohibit a criminal conviction in all cases except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which a defendant is charged.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
The statues pertinent to this issue are:
Burglary--(1) A person is guilty of burglary
if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building
or any portion of a building with intent to
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault
on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which
event it is a felony of the second degree.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended).
Definitions—For the purposes of this part:
... (2) "Dwelling" means a building which is
-19-

usually occupied by a person lodging therein
at night, whether or not a person is actually
present.
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully"
in or upon premises when the premises or any
portion thereof at: the time of the entry or
remaining are not open to the public and when the
actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged
to enter or remain on the premises or such
portion thereof.
(4) "Enter11 means:
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under
control of the actor.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 (1953 as amended).
It is clear that Che state must provide evidence
regarding both the act (unlawful entry) and the intent
(to commit a felony, theft or an assault while within the
dwelling).

The state must put forth evidence proving, beyond

a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Ellis and Mr. Withers entered
the home on Harvard Avenue unlawfully, and that, while inside
the home, they intended to commit a felony, theft or an
assault.

The Appellants contend that even when viewed in

the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the prosecution's
evidence is insufficient to establish that they were inside
the allegedly burglarized home on the night in question, let
alone that they were inside that home fully possessed of
the requisite mens rea

for second degree burglary.
A.

THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO ESTABLISH, BEYOND A R E A S O N A B I ^ H ) O U B T ,
THAT THE DEFENDANTS COMMITTED THE ACTUS
REUS OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

-20-

As defense counsel for Mr, Ellis stated when
arguing for the motion to arrest judgment, "this was a very
circumstantial case [;] there was absolutelv no direct
evidence as to these two people [the defendants] being in
that home on that evening." (R.442)

The trial Judge agreed,

"...the case...is based mainly, maybe a hundred percent, on
circumstantial evidence." (R.446)
A review of the trial transcripts and opposing counsel's
arguments in the motion to arrest judgment indicates that the
strongest evidence for the state was that shortly after the
police had responded to the burglar alarm, a distinctively
colored vehicle (purportedly the one the defendants were found
in) drove slowly past the house in question and then sped off
when it reached the intersection at the end of the street.

The

remainder of the state's circumstantial evidence bearing upon
the actus reus consisted of lay opinion as to the similarity
of various footprints, (T.20-30) lay comparison of the
defendantsfs footwear and poor quality police photographs, (T.22)
and a blood stain on the curtain behind a broken window in the
house (T.15).

When added together, this evidence cannot

reasonably foreclose all explanations of the facts except the
one that says the defendants broke into the home.
Because too many alternative reasonable theories of
the prosecution's facts, consistent with the innocence of the
defendants, exist, the state did not carry its burden of proof.
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B.
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO ESTABLISH THAT THE DEFENDANTS
POSSESSED THE ME1NS REA OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
Utah has extensive case law on the intent requirement
for burglary.

In State v. Brooks, 631 P. 2d 878, 881 (Utah

1981), this Court stated that the intent to commit a felony,
theft, or assault must be proven, or circumstances must be
shown from which the intent may reasonably be inferred.

It

is recognized that because intent is a state of mind, it is
rarely susceptible to direct proof.

Therefore, the intent

to steal while unlawfully entering a dwelling can be inferred
by the conduct and the circumstances presented at trial, in
light of human experience.
Thus, in State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah
1981), this Court held that "[w]hen one breaks and enters
a building in the nighttime, without consent, an inference
may be drawn that he did so to commit larceny."

Other acts

sufficient to raise this inference of intent include a showing
that the defendant entered an apartment by ladder at night and
fled, leaving his car behind, when officers arrived, State v.
Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P.2d 486 (Utah 1961); a showing
that the defendant was caught in a closed store at night near
the store's safe with a drill and drill bits, People v. Morton,
4 Utah 407, 11 P.512 (Utah 1886).

See also State v. Syddall,

20 Utah 2d 73, 433 P.2d L0 (Utah 1967) (nighttime breaking
and entering raises inference of intent)^ State v. Tellay,
7 Utah 2d 308, 324 P.2d 490 (Utah 1958) (nighttime breaking
and entering raises inference); and State v. Evans, 279 P.950

(Utah 1929) (nighttime breaking and entering raises inference).
Most recently, in State v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 1058 (Utah
1985) , this court held that direct evidence showing the
defendant broke a window to gain entry into a locked building
reasonably gave rise to the inference that he intended to commit
theft therein.

The per curiam decision pointed out that

?f

[t]he

fact nothing was missed when he [the defendant] was apprehended
is no defense to the burglary charge, nor does it destroy the
inference of intent to steal at the time of entry.ff Id.at 1060.
The state has the burden of proving that the defendants,
in the case before this Court, unlawfully entered the home in
question with the requisite intent to commit a theft or other
felony.

As the cases cited above point out, this intent can

be inferred if evidence of conduct or circumstances is
presented making such an inference reasonable.
evidence was presented in this case.

But no such

In each of the cases

cited above, the lower courts allowed an inference of intent
to be drawn from clear and direct indications that the respective
defendants had unlawfully entered a building.

In the present

case, Mr. Withers and Mr. Ellis were not caught in the residence
in question.

Nobody saw them enter or leave the home. No

burglary tools or instruments were entered into evidence.

There

was no evidence of a plan or scheme or commit theft, such as
testimony, accomplices, etc.
Because of the state's failure to proffer even prima
facie direct evidence that the defendants entered the home, the

state has failed to provide prima facie evidence as to the
existence of an intent to commit theft at the time of the
alleged entrance into the home.

The defendants respectfully

submit that reasonable minds could not differ:

guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt was not a verdict warranted by the evidence
adduced in the court below.

The court erred in denying

defense counsel's motions to arrest judgment on the basis of
insufficiency of the evidence.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GIVE THE DEFEiffiMTS^^QUESTED JURY"
INSTRUCTION.
The state's case against Gary Lynn Ellis and Marty
R. Withers was entirely circumstantial (see p. 21 supra).
Given this fact, the Court below committed reversible error
when it refused to give the alternative reasonable hypothesis
instruction requested by defense counsel (T.II 159).
The instruction requested by defense counsel was:
To warrant you in convicting the defendant of the
crime charged in the information, or of any crime
included there, the evidence must, to your minds,
exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than
that of guilt of the defendant; that is to say,
if after a full and fair consideration and
comparison of all the testimony in the case you
can reasonably explain the facts in evidence on
any reasonable ground other than the guilt of the
defendant, then you must find him not guilty. (R.58)
The instruction given by the court below was :
All presumptions of law, independant of
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a
defendant is presumed innocent until he is
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
And
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether his
guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to
an acquittal.

I have heretofore told you that the burden is
upon the State to prove the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Now, by reasonable
doubt is meant a doubt that is based on reason
and one which is reasonable in view of all the
evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
that degree of proof which satisfies the mind
and convinces the understanding of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it. A
reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable
men and women would entertain, and it must arise
from the evidence or the lack of the evidence
in this case.
If after an impartial consideration and comparison
of all the evidence in the case you can candidly
say that you are not satisfied of the defendant's
guilt, you have a reasonable doubt. But if after
such impartial consideration and comparison of all
the evidence you can truthfully say that you have an
abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt such
as you will be willing to act upon in the more
weighty and important matters relating to your
own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. A
reasonable doubt must be a rea! substantial doubt
and not one that is merely possible or imaginary
(R.77).
The question of whether an entirely circumstantial
case mandates a reasonable hypothesis instruction is not clearly
answered by the law in this jurisdiction.

There does exist,

however, persuasive authority for proposing that in Utah an
alternative reasonable instruction must be given where a case
against a defendant is completely circumstantial.
In State v. Dumas, 554 P.2d 1313, 1315 (Utah 1976), this
court held that not giving a reasonable hypothesis jury instruction
was not error where the evidence before the jury was not
entirely circumstantial:
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The trial court refused to give the instruction
because the evidence in the case was not entirely
circumstantial. We think he did not err in his
refusal. In this case there was direct, positive
evidence that the defendant, Dumas, was a knowing
participant in the commission of the robbery. There
were no inferred facts to be explained on any
hypothesis, reasonable or unreasonable. It was
a question of credibility to be given to the
witnesses.
In the present case, all that exists are inferred
facts; the case is entirely circumstantial.

Dumas mandates

the use of the alternative reasonable hypothesis instruction
in this case.
1316:

Justice Ellett concluded in Dumas, supra at

!!

where the only proof of material fact or one which is

a necessary element of defendant's guilt consists of circumstantial evidence, such circumstances must reasonably preclude
every reasonable hypothesis of defendant's innocence."
Mr. Withers and Mr. Ellis contend that a mere reasonable
doubt instruction lulls the jury into a stagnant, uncreative
focus on the theory of the facts as the prosecution has
presented them—especially if the defendants are somehow
unappealling characters; the alternative reasonable hypothesis
instruction is more likely to invest the ]ury with a proper
sense of their duty to rule out reasonable alternative theories
about what the defendants were doing on the night in question
before a guilty verdict can be returned.

A trial court should

do everything within its power to ensure that a jury, faced
with deciphering a case of 1007o circumstantial evidence, knows
precisely what reasonable doubt means.

The reasonable hypothesis

instruction is a simple way for the trial court to fulfill this

obligation to the jury.

The defendants respectfully submit

that the lower court's failure to give the iury a reasonable
hypothesis instruction constitutes reversible error.
POINT V
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF MISTAKES AT TRIAL
CONSTITUTES REVERSlBLfi ERROR.
The defendants have pointed to several errors bearing
upon their conviction in the court below.

All of the inadmissible

testimony and evidence, the Court's failure to sever the
defendants1 trial, the insufficiency of the evidence and the
lack of an adequate jury instruction combine to create
reversible error in this case.

Although we cannot know what

evidence the jury considered in reaching its verdict, the
amount of inappropriate evidence that was admitted, and the
amount of prejudicial error that was committed, itfi this case
cannot be ignored.
The cumulative effect of these errors, if not the
individual errors themselves, warrants a new trial.

In

Gooden v. State, 617 P.2d 248, 250 (Okl. Crim. ADD. 1980),
the State Court held:
When a revieitf of the entire record reveals
numerous irregularities that tend to prejudice
the rights of a defendant and where an
accumulation of errors denies a defendant a »
fair trial, the case will be reversed, even
though one of the errors, standing alone, would
not be ample to justify reversal.
The prejudicial effect of the errors in this case
cannot be quantified.

Nevertheless, no juror could have

ignored all of the inadmissible evidence and imoroper court
instructions.

The judgment below must be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The court below abused its discretion in refusing
to sever the defendants1 joint trial after ruling the
defendants1 contradictory, out of court statements were
admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule.

By

refusing the defendants1 motion to sever, the trial court
effectively allowed the prosecution to try the defendants
ex parte because the statements were not entered in a
form subject to cross examination. The defendants were
denied their essential Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation
and effective assistance of counsel.

The court committed

further serious error by allowing a lay witness to offer
what amounted to expert opinion testimony.

This inadmissible

evidence, coupled with the rest of the prosecution's entirely
circumstantial case, however, was still not enough to
reasonably warrant a verdict against the defendants.

Under

Utah law, the state did not bear its burden of proof with
respect to either the actus reus or the mens rea of the
crime charged against the defendants.

The trial court should

have granted defense counselsf motions to arrest judgment
based on the insufficiency of the evidence.

Finally, the

court below erred in not giving the alternative reasonable
hypothesis instruction requested by defense counsel.

Because

of these errors and their seriously prejudicial cumulative
effect, the defendants request that their convictions be
reversed and that their cases be remanded for new and separate
trials, or, in the alternative, that the charges against them
be dismissed.

Respectfully submitted this

'°"

day of December,

1985

KAREN JENNINGS
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants

CURTIS NESSET
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
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Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
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CURTIS NESSET
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

MOTION TO SEVER

:

Case No. CR-84-501

Plaintiff
v.
GARY LYNN ELLIS,
Defendant
The defendant, GARY LYNN ELLIS, by and through his attorney
of record, CONNIE L. MOWER, hereby moves to sever his trial from
his co-defendant, MARTY R. WITHERS aka MARTY WOLF, on the grounds
and for the reason that a joint trial would violate the defendant's
right to confrontation of witnesses against him as stated in Article
I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah and the 6th and 14th
Amendments of the United States Constitution as interpretated
in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
DATED this - j r

day of May, 1984.

v/^e^

CONNIE L. MOWER
Attorney for Defendant

H i ED III ^ L F ' ^ S sOFFICE
"' 'I -"AH
.A r i i t

t if

JUL26
LISA A. MAXFIELD
CONNIE L . MOWER

BosHN'M

I^XOr- > •*
* '3^4 . .

tcr^
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Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MOTION TO SFVERE AND
NOTICE OF HEARING

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
-vMARTY R. WITHERS aka WOLF and
GARY LYNN ELLIS,

Case No. CR84-501
HOMER F. WILKINSON

Co-Defendants

The co-defendants, MARTY R. WITHERS aka WOLFE and
GARY LYNN ELLIS, by and throuqh their attorneys of record,
LISA A. MAXFIELD and CONNIE L. MOWER, hereby moves to sever
their trials from the other co-defendant on the grounds and
for the reason that a joint trial would violate their
defendant's rights to confrontation of witnesses against
them as stated in Articles I, Section 12 of the Constitution
of Utah and the 6th or 14th Amendments of the United States
Constitution as interpretated in Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123 (1968) .
DATED this

•u
day
2£f<

of July, 1984.

LISA A. MAXFIELD
Attorney for co-defendant"Withers
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County of Salt Lake-State of Utah
FILE NO
TITLE:
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COUNSEL:

2L-

( l ^ Counsel Present)
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fSTATEOFUTAH
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L ^

?M0)/
G.A. CHItPS
Al AN SMITH
GRQVER MEDLEY

.Clerk
.Reporter
.Bailiff

HON: HOMER FTWILKIHSON
DATE:

Based upon
counsel for the
orders the
*hipeaaen of
•

Based on Court's motion, the Court hereby orders the trial reset to
for the reason of

•

The above named defendant having been granted a stay of execution of sentence to this date. Now on the court's owr
motion and good cause appearing therefor, it is ordered that said defendant be granted a further stay of execution 01
sentence to

•

The above named defendant having been granted a stay of execution of sentence to this date. Now on the court's owi
motion and good cause appearing therefor, it is ordered that the probation of said defendant is terminated and he i
released from supervision.

D

Based on non-appearance of the defendant
on • motion of the County Attorney or •
deft, returnable forthwith Q
No Bail

•

Based upon motion of counsel for the State and good cause appearing therefor, it is ordered that the above entitled cas
be and same is dismissed for the reason of

•

Based upon entry of defendant's plea in case no:
the State, it is ordered that the above entitled case be and same is dismissed.

•

APPD Notified

•

Placed copy of M. E. in APPD Box

•

APPD Agent

•

.an<
Court's own motion, it is ordered that a bench warrant issue for sai<
•
Bail $
.

and on motion of counsel fc

.at APF

Called

Present

FILED IN CLERK-S OFFICE
Salt Lake County. Utah

AUG 2 7 1984
LISA A. MAXFIELD #2128
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
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y

-*r*"~-

•—

rwmtv
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION FOR ARREST OF
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff
-vMARTY WITHERS aka WOLFE,

Case No. CR84-501
HOMER F. WILKINSON

Defendant

The defendant, MARTY WITHERS aka WOLFE, by and through
his attorney, LISA A. MAXFIELD, hereby moves this Court pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §77-35-23 (1953 as amended) to arrest judgment
in the above-entitled case.
Defendant bases his motion on the grounds that after
the jury verdict was read, his co-defendant told the prosecutor
that Mr. Withers did, in fact, pass out from alcohol consumption
on the evening of the alleged burglary; and that Mr. Withers
played no part and had no knowledge of a burglary.
The prosecutor, Mr. Harward, then indicated that he
would join the defense in a motion to arrest judgment.
The defendant also submits that there' wqrs insu/ficient
evidence presented agcii^rslfhim upon whicnteOoase k gfiiil/ty verdict,

SUBMITTED this 27

day of Augusj

FILED IN OUERK'9 OFFICE
Salt Lake County, Utah
CONNIE L. MOWER #2339
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
Attorney for Defendant
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone:
532-5444

SEP i 01984
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION FOR ARREST
OF JUDGMENT

Plaintiff
v.
GARY LYNN ELLIS,

Case *T0. CR-S4-501
WOMER F. WILKINSON

Defendant

The defendant, GARY LYNN ELLIS, by and through his attorney
of record, CONNIE L. MOWER, hereby moves this Court pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-23 (1953 as amended) to arrest judgment
in the above entitled case.

Defendant bases his motion on the

grounds that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial
upon which the jury could properly render a verdit of guilty.
DATED this

day of Seotember, 1984.

LilH^

CONNIE L. MOWER
Attorney for Defendant
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah
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Based upon motion of——^
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The above named defendant having been granted a stay of execution of sentence to this date. Now on the court's own
motion and good cause appearing therefor, it is ordered that said defendant be granted a further stay of execution of
sentence to
.
The above named defendant having been granted a stay of execution of sentence to this date. Now on the court's own
motion and good cause appearing therefor, it is ordered that the probation of said defendant is terminated and he is
released from supervision.
Based on non-appearance of the defendant
on Q motion of the County Attorney or •
deft, returnable forthwith Q
No Bail

.and
Court's own motion, it is ordered that a bench warrant issue for said
•
Bail $
.

Based upon motion of counsel for the State and good cause appearing therefor, it is ordered that the above entitled case
be and same is dismissed for the reason of

Based upon entry of defendant's plea in case no:
the State, it is ordered that the above entitled case be and same is dismissed.
APPD Notified

•

Called

.at APPD

Placed copy of M. E. in APPD Box
APPD Agent

. and on motion of counsel for

Present

